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1011 
INNOVATIVE COPYRIGHT 
Greg Lastowka* 
Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intel-
lectual Property and Antitrust Law. By Michael A. Carrier. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 2009. Pp. viii, 412. $65. 
Introduction 
For over a decade, Michael Carrier1 has been exploring the intersection 
of antitrust and intellectual property (“IP”) law, contributing many articles 
that offer new solutions and approaches to the vexing problems confronting 
the law of innovation.2 Carrier’s academic writing is situated in a volumi-
nous scholarly discourse about the appropriate rules and goals of the laws of 
copyright, patent, and antitrust. 
While Carrier easily could have written an “insider” tome for specialists 
in this area, his new book, Innovation for the 21st Century, is targeted at a 
broader audience. Carrier’s book is directed at legislators, jurists, and opin-
ion makers—as well as interested readers—who want to understand these 
questions and may play some part in legal reforms. It follows, given his 
broad audience, that Carrier faces some challenges describing the special-
ized fields of copyright, patent, and antitrust law.  
To overcome this hurdle, Carrier writes two books in one. Carrier spends 
the first hundred pages of his book providing the general reader with a basic 
primer on the laws of copyright, patent, and antitrust (Chapters One to 
Five). This primer is reason enough to recommend Carrier’s book. With 
clarity and verve, it leads the novice quickly and effectively through the key 
doctrines and cases. Carrier notes important scholarly voices, but does not 
get bogged down in excessive complexities.  
The primer, however, is just a stepping stone on the way to Carrier’s real 
agenda, which is convincing the reader that the existing law he describes 
must be reformed to better promote innovation. To put it mildly, Carrier is 
enthusiastic about the social benefits attending technological innovation. He 
argues, congruently, that innovation should be the pole star guiding both IP 
and antitrust policy (p. 33).  
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. While Professor Carrier is my 
colleague and friend, I assure the reader that both the praise and the criticism of his book in this  
Review are heartfelt and genuine.  I would like to thank my research assistant Jake Flothe for help-
ing me with this project. 
 1. Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. 
 2. E.g., Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite 
Innovation, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1047 (2003) [hereinafter Carrier, Patent-Antitrust Paradox]; Michael 
A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (2002). 
LASTOWKA FTP PAGINATED.DOC 3/7/2011 1:03:03 PM 
1012 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 109:1011 
 
Carrier spends the majority of his book applying his innovation-centered 
framework to existing law (Chapters Six to Thirteen). He does this by offer-
ing ten specific proposals for reforms of copyright, patent, and antitrust law. 
Even those who are skeptical of Carrier’s proposals must admire his ambi-
tion here: he moves from his guiding theory to a general legal primer to ten 
contextual applications, all in the span of less than four hundred pages.  
Legal specialists will no doubt find the velocity of the book somewhat 
alarming and perhaps ill-advised. Tackling the future of patent, antitrust, and 
copyright in separate books might seem like a more prudent and conserva-
tive methodology. Yet Carrier is concerned primarily about intersections and 
overarching goals. He therefore makes the strategic decision to summarize a 
broad field and cut to the chase about a range of problems and solutions. 
Amazingly, he manages to pull it off. Without taking shortcuts, Carrier 
makes a soup-to-nuts argument for legal reforms in three diverse fields in a 
way that is accessible to the general reader. 
In the next few pages, I will briefly explore Carrier’s threshold problem, 
the tension between the law of IP and antitrust. Carrier offers to solve this 
tension by refocusing the law on innovation policy, letting innovation steer 
the agenda for resolving any conflicts at the IP-antitrust border.  
Following this discussion, I will turn to Carrier’s proposals for copyright 
law reform. After describing these reform proposals, I conclude with my 
reaction: while I support Carrier’s proposed reforms wholeheartedly, I wor-
ry that they do not go far enough. Copyright law, I argue, is in need of much 
more radical reforms in order to resolve its contemporary conflicts with in-
novative technologies. 
I. Intellectual Property & Market Competition  
A large part of Carrier’s book is about the tension between antitrust and 
intellectual property. The history of the legal intersection is explored in 
some detail in his primer (Chapter Four). Carrier’s solution to the tension is 
to let innovation harmonize IP and antitrust law.3 Yet the tension that Carrier 
seeks to overcome is itself a subject of some dispute. So first, I should brief-
ly summarize how Carrier understands that tension. 
Antitrust law is generally wary of granting individuals and firms exclu-
sive rights to sell particular commodities in the marketplace. Courts will 
frequently prefer market competition to monopoly power (accompanied by 
the monopolist’s predatory activity), given that vibrant competition among 
firms lowers consumer prices and rewards more efficient producers of goods 
and services (pp. 56–61).  
Intellectual property law, on the other hand, creates what seem to be 
monopolies. Patent and copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right to com-
mercialize their inventions and creative works (Chapter Two). Intellectual 
property rights necessarily entail the legal suppression of market competi-
tion in favor of these exclusive rights (pp. 37–43, 72). While the substitution 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Carrier, Patent-Antitrust Paradox, supra note 2, at 1053–62.  
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of replacement inventions and works might serve to reduce or even negate 
the market power represented by a copyright or patent, the law does seem 
designed in a way that prevents a form of market competition for the pro-
tected work or invention itself. So, we might ask, is intellectual property 
generally problematic from an antitrust perspective? 
The answer to that question has varied over time, as Carrier explains 
(Chapter Four). As a matter of theory, it should first be noted that IP laws 
are not designed for the purpose of granting commercial monopolies, even if 
a sort of monopoly is obtained through copyright and patent entitlements. 
Instead, these rights are provided, in theory, to benefit society, albeit indi-
rectly. As the Constitution tersely explains (and IP rights holders sometimes 
forget), copyrights and patents are intended to “promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts.”4 
Patents and copyrights are, from the standard legal theoretical perspec-
tive, a sort of bargain between society and those who create new things: they 
establish commercial incentives designed to entice more individuals to in-
vest more resources in creativity and technological innovation.5 The right to 
monopolize, commercially, one’s own works and inventions presumably 
leads more authors and inventors to pursue copyrights and patents. Society 
benefits from this race for property rights, the theory goes, because in the 
absence of IP rights, fewer individuals would engage in this sort of labor. 
Society would be left with less creativity and less innovation. 
Of course, while the theory provides that IP contributes to innovation 
and creativity, everyone knows that IP rights are not absolutely necessary to 
produce art and inventions. A glance at the history books tells us this. An-
cient civilizations produced quite a few original artworks and clever 
inventions. IP rights clearly had no part in all of this ancient creativity and 
invention. This is because patent and copyright are legal newcomers, only a 
few centuries old. The theory must be, therefore, that IP rights encourage 
greater, more socially optimal production of inventions and artistic works. 
The law seems to be designed on the premise that some additional incentive 
is needed, but the question is really how much of an IP right produces the 
optimal social benefits. IP law, courts often say, strikes a “delicate balance” 
between limited exclusive rights and the default condition of free market 
competition.  
Perhaps the clearest restriction on IP protection is the limited duration of 
copyrights and patents. According to the Constitution, these are granted “for 
limited Times.”6 Given that neither people nor commercial firms live forever, 
perpetual and exclusive property rights in inventions and creative works are 
not required to optimally encourage individual and collective creativity and 
invention. Because copyrights and patents are limited in duration, it follows 
                                                                                                                      
 4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 5. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214–15 (2003) (discussing the “bargain” established 
by copyright between the public and the author). 
 6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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that all works and inventions must eventually be fully returned to the com-
mons of the competitive marketplace.  
The “delicate balance,” however, is struck not only with regard to the 
duration of IP rights, but also with regard to the power and scope of those 
rights. Strong or weak legal protections might be applied to existing IP 
rights and the market strength of existing IP rights must also be balanced 
against the background presumption of vigorous market competition.  
In explaining the history of this balancing act, Carrier briefly describes 
the story of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing 
Co., a 1917 Supreme Court decision.7 The plaintiff dominated the U.S. film 
industry and also held a patent in its film projector technology. As a condi-
tion of the patent, it required those who used its projectors to display only 
its own films. The defendant had used the projector with independent films, 
but argued that this was not an infringement of the patent because the patent 
concerned only the film projector, not the films shown on it.  
When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, antitrust instincts won out 
over the power of IP rights. The Supreme Court found the plaintiff’s restric-
tion was invalid “because such a film is obviously not any part of the 
invention of the patent in suit.”8 To enforce the patent right against the de-
fendant “would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of 
moving picture films wholly outside of the patent in suit.”9  
Justice Holmes, joined by Justices McKenna and Van Devanter, dis-
sented. Summarizing his argument, Holmes stated that, because a patent 
owner “may keep his device wholly out of use . . . . I cannot understand why 
he may not keep it out of use unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that, 
the buyer, will use some unpatented thing in connection with it.”10  
Holmes’s argument was actually consistent with the late-nineteeth- and 
early-twentieth-century consensus on this issue, which gave patent owners 
effective immunity from antitrust law when they relied on their patent pow-
ers (pp. 73–74). As Carrier explains, the prior rule held that if a patent 
holder could bar others from using the patent absolutely, it followed that a 
patent holder should also have the right to bar, absolutely, particular sorts of 
uses (p. 74).  
As the twentieth century progressed, courts retreated further from their 
extreme deference to patents, often limiting patent rights in favor of antitrust 
scrutiny (pp. 74–77). Yet in the later decades, the pendulum swung back, 
reinvigorating patent strength and defeating any antitrust presumptions 
based on IP rights (pp. 78–85). Five years ago, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that IP rights should not serve to establish any general presumption 
of “market power” (in the antitrust sense of that term).11 Yet, although IP has 
                                                                                                                      
 7. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 8. Id. at 518. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 519 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 11. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006).  
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the edge on antitrust at the moment, the borders in this area are still not 
firmly fixed. Litigation and debate over the relationship continues.12  
II. Prioritizing Innovation 
In any complex legal field, the law’s animating goals can easily be lost 
in clouds of nebulous doctrine and thickets of statutory text. Carrier’s an-
swer to this ongoing tension between IP and antitrust law is to focus on a 
pole star: innovation. Since the promotion of innovation is certainly an im-
portant goal in both IP and antitrust law, this will seem to many readers like 
a rather sensible idea. 
Yet some beg to differ. Patent, antitrust, and copyright vary in the degree 
to which they pay service to innovation goals. As Carrier notes, patent law 
is, at least in theory, firmly wedded to the pursuit of innovation. Patent law 
doctrine may express, at various places and in various contexts, a consider-
able range of deontological commitments. However, the prime directive of 
patent law is clearly the pursuit of technological innovation.  
But what about antitrust? Antitrust certainly promotes innovation indi-
rectly by promoting competition. But antitrust also seeks to lower market 
prices. And copyright, as Carrier readily admits, is not usually thought of as 
a law that promotes technological innovation at all. Instead, it is understood 
as promoting new forms of creative expression, which is arguably a rather 
different thing (pp. 102–03). 
Carrier is therefore proposing to redirect the internal compasses of these 
three doctrines to differing degrees. Patent law is minimally reoriented by 
Carrier; antitrust is significantly reoriented (but given its current deference 
to patent, perhaps not so very much); and copyright law is set on a nearly 
perpendicular course to its traditional momentum. So with respect to copy-
right law, we can brand Carrier’s innovation theory as somewhat radical. Of 
course, for the specialist, selecting a radical theoretical engine is all well and 
good, but the devil of any reform proposal is in the details.  
Taking a holistic view of Carrier’s ten proposals, my general impression 
is that Carrier has, consistent with his decision to write a book that moti-
vates a broad audience to action, managed to artfully combine practical 
politics with the norms of scholarship. He uses the former’s consensus-
building tactics to marshal the latter’s voices.  
This is no mean feat. Legal scholars tend to write against each other, fa-
voring novel insights and critically attacking conventional wisdom. They 
score scant career points, so to speak, by agreeing with each other on the 
details of what must be done. Politicians, on the other hand, are more effec-
tive in their work when they appeal to eternal truths, popular 
understandings, and consensus—glossing over nuances and minor dis-
agreements. Carrier’s book strikes a balance between the two, drawing, in a 
                                                                                                                      
 12. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 
Ala. L. Rev. 103 (2008); Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, 
and Market Power, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 837 (2007). 
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political manner, on the scholarly consensus found in legal writings about IP 
and antitrust. He has pinpointed multiple areas where a majority of IP and 
antitrust scholars will agree about, at the very least, the nature of the prob-
lem. His proposals steer through the ongoing debates by locating careful and 
consensus-building compromises between various contemporary legal scho-
lars who have also explored these areas. 
For instance, consider the following three proposals—one regarding pat-
ent, one regarding antitrust, and one at the patent-antitrust intersection. First, 
in patent law, Carrier observes that perhaps half of granted patents are, when 
tested in court, held invalid. Where innovators are required to pay for li-
censes to use invalid patents, this operates as an anticompetitive drag on 
innovation. To tackle the problem of bad patents, Carrier proposes that the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) adopt a means for 
post-grant challenges (Chapter Nine) to provide innovators with a quick and 
inexpensive alternative to licensing (or an infringement lawsuit). The prob-
lem of invalid patents is widely recognized today, and Carrier’s proposal 
seems like a sensible shortcut designed to avoid protracted litigation.  
Second, in the antitrust arena, fear of antitrust law often prevents busi-
ness from collectively adopting useful industry standards, despite the 
benefits of such standards in terms of innovation-promoting interoperability. 
Greater consensus on interoperability standards would surely promote 
greater capacity for technological innovation. Carrier accordingly supports 
the relaxation of antitrust scrutiny of standard-setting organizations (Chapter 
Fourteen). Again, this mirrors the arguments of other scholars writing on the 
standards issue, not to mention mirroring the positions generally taken by 
antitrust enforcement agencies. 
Third, Carrier criticizes the contemporary practice in the pharmaceutical 
industry of engineering “reverse payment settlements,” a practice by which 
patent owners sue and then pay off allegedly infringing generic drug mak-
ers. These payments seem to indicate that firms with weak patents are, in 
fact, sustaining monopoly profits by preventing patent challenges and keep-
ing generic drugs off the market. With respect to reverse payment 
settlements, Carrier argues that antitrust scrutiny should be stronger (Chap-
ter Fifteen). Again, the problem here has garnered substantial attention and 
Carrier’s proposal seems reasonable and modest: he seeks an industry-
specific default presumption. 
These three proposals, and four other patent and antitrust proposals, 
have already weathered a first round of review from law professors who are 
specialists in these fields.13 They were the subject of a double blog 
symposium held in March 2009 by the “Truth on the Market” blog (which 
focuses on competition law) and the “Patently-O” blog (which focuses on 
patent law).14 Notably, criticism was largely focused on the details of 
                                                                                                                      
 13. The pool of blog reviewers consisted of Dan Crane, Dennis Crouch, Brett Frischmann, 
Scott Kieff, Geoff Manne, Phil Weiser, and Josh Wright. 
 14. Symposium, Welcome to the 1st TOTM Blog Symposium on Michael Carrier’s Innova-
tion in the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, Truth 
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Carrier’s specific proposals and the proper weight that should be granted to 
the evidence Carrier uses to support his claims.15 Carrier has already 
responded extensively to this first round of critical commentary.16  
Rather than recapitulate that earlier debate, I want to focus on a particu-
larly large and important stone that was left substantially unturned. With the 
exception of some brief reactions by Professor Brett Frischmann,17 Carrier’s 
discussion of copyright law and innovation was essentially ignored. 
Yet Carrier devotes roughly one hundred pages of his book to copyright 
law (pp. 101–97) and identifies his copyright proposals as the most far-
reaching reforms he proposes. He declares: “Of all the changes recom-
mended, the copyright proposals promise to unleash the greatest innovation” 
(p. 12). As I stated above, Carrier’s copyright proposals are, at least at a 
theoretical level, his most radical reforms. So, setting aside the debate con-
cerning Carrier’s antitrust and patent proposals, I want to respond to his 
prescriptions for copyright.  
III. Carrier’s Copyright Proposals 
In Chapters Six to Eight, Carrier offers three proposals for the reform of 
copyright law. First, in Chapter Six, Carrier recommends a return to the 
copyright infringement standard known as the Sony rule, which applies to 
those who make and distribute devices that are used to commit copyright 
infringement (pp. 105–45). 
Sony Co. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.18 is the landmark 
1984 Supreme Court case where the motion picture industry failed in its 
efforts to outlaw (or at least license) the technology of the videocassette re-
corder. Sony manufactured the Betamax, which was used by consumers to 
make copies of television broadcasts.19 Since copying television broadcasts 
ostensibly amounted to copyright infringement, the motion picture industry 
brought suit against Sony, arguing it should be held liable under a “contribu-
tory copyright infringement” standard.20 
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, sided with Sony. The vote was 
close: Justices O’Connor and Brennan apparently switched sides after 
                                                                                                                      
on the Market (Mar. 29, 2009), http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/03/29/welcome-to-the-1st-
totm-blog-symposium-on-michael-carriers-innovation-in-the-21st-century-harnessing-the-power-of-
intellectual-property-and-antitrust-law/. These reviews have now been edited and republished as a 
printed issue of the Alabama Law Review. See 61 ALA. L. REV. 553 (2010).  
 15. E.g., Daniel Crane, Crane on Carrier’s Innovation in the 21st Century, Truth on the 
Market (Mar. 30, 2009), http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/03/30/crane-on-carriers-innovation-in-
the-21st-century/. 
 16. Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response to Seven Critics, 61 
Ala. L. Rev. 597 (2010). 
 17. Brett Frischmann, Frischmann on Carrier’s Innovation in the 21st Century, Truth on 
the Market (Mar. 31 2009), http://truthonthemarket.com/2009/03/30/frischmann-on-carriers-
innovation-in-the-21st-century/. 
 18. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 434. 
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initially favoring the motion picture industry.21 The Sony decision, however, 
was a win for those who favored new consumer technologies over copyright. 
It is read to create a safe harbor for “dual-use” technologies that shields 
manufacturers from copyright infringement liability. This safe harbor is im-
portant to legitimate uses of these technologies because although, for 
instance, videocassette recorders can be useful in infringing copyrights, they 
can also be used to make lawful copies (including “fair use” copies). Com-
pletely outlawing new copying technologies would effectively prevent the 
use of those technologies for noninfringing and socially productive pur-
poses.  
While the Sony safe harbor rule still applies to those who make and sell 
devices with “substantial non-infringing uses,” more recent caselaw, includ-
ing the Supreme Court’s Grokster decision,22 place new limitations on the 
Sony rule, arguably undercutting its power to shield technology manufactur-
ers from litigation and liability. Carrier argues that courts should return to 
the technology-favoring standard announced in Sony (pp. 144–45).  
The innovation benefits from this proposal are fairly straightforward. 
With a strong Sony rule, companies will be more likely to invest in the crea-
tion and marketing of dual-use technologies, which can pave the way for 
add-on innovations. Without a strong Sony rule, creators of dual-use tech-
nologies will be less likely to attract business partners and investors. These 
parties will have a reasonable fear that copyright law will outlaw new tech-
nologies and—worse yet—expose those offering new technologies to 
crippling damage awards. A strong Sony rule helps to avoid this outcome.  
Carrier’s second proposal, set forth in Chapter Seven, takes up the ques-
tion of those crippling damage awards directly. Specifically, he proposes 
reducing the statutory damages awards provided under copyright law (pp. 
147–61). Under existing law, a copyright owner is entitled to elect to re-
ceive, as an alternative to the actual damages caused by the infringement, a 
statutory damages remedy of up to $30,000 per work infringed. This remedy 
can be increased to $150,000 per work in cases where the infringement is 
“willful.”23 It follows that under the current statute, a teenager who know-
ingly and willfully violates copyright law by copying a “mix” of ten songs 
on an iPod or a home computer could, in theory, be liable for over  
$1,000,000 in damages to copyright holders. 
Carrier does not suggest that statutory damages should be eliminated (p. 
160). Rather, he proposes limiting the remedy to apply only to direct in-
fringers. In a case like Sony, where the defendant is charged with 
contributing to infringement by virtue of supplying a technology, Carrier 
would make statutory damages unavailable, forcing those who sue makers 
of dual-use technologies to prove their actual damages (pp. 160–61). Carrier 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Various blow-by-blow accounts of the Sony case exist. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The 
Sony Paradox, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 917 (2005); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding 
Sony, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 941 (2007). 
 22. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(b) (2006). 
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supports this proposal by pointing to cases where makers of innovative 
technologies have been ordered to pay millions or billions of dollars in sta-
tutory damages. In effect, Carrier’s argument is that the statutory damages 
remedy, when applied to technology manufacturers, amounts to virtual capi-
tal punishment. 
Just as a strong Sony rule will allow innovators to better attract investors 
and business partners, Carrier’s second proposal will reduce the downside 
risks of launching innovative technologies, achieving essentially the same 
result. Under Carrier’s proposal, damage awards against technological inno-
vators must be premised on facts, not punitive zeal. This approach 
recognizes the social benefits of innovative technology. 
Carrier’s third copyright proposal concerns the anticircumvention provi-
sions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) (pp. 163–97). 
The DMCA made many changes to copyright law, but the anticircumvention 
provisions are easily the most controversial. Though they are embodied in 
fairly complex statutory language, in simple terms they prohibit the circum-
vention of technological measures that control access to copyrighted 
works.24 Essentially, the provisions outlaw both “hacking” the technologies 
that protect copyrighted material and the distribution of tools that are used 
to do the same. The DMCA ensures that the technological “locks” of copy-
righted works cannot be broken by the general public.  
The anticircumvention provisions have no doctrinal connection to any 
actual infringing use of the copyright-protected work. Arguably they are not 
really akin to traditional copyright law at all, but constitute a new form of 
private right in the architecture of consumer goods. In any case, in their 
short history, these provisions have enabled a great deal of anti-competitive 
mischief. Given that (1) computer software is protected by copyright law, 
and (2) computer software is now found in all manner of devices, it is no 
surprise that the DMCA has been employed by plaintiffs primarily inter-
ested in preventing competition in the markets for interoperable devices.  
For instance, contemporary printer cartridges interact with and gain ac-
cess to printers’ programs. Indeed, in one well-known case discussed by 
Carrier, Lexmark, a printer manufacturer, attempted to use the DMCA to 
prohibit the sale of replacement printer cartridges by a competitor (pp. 185–
86). In another case, a plaintiff attempted to use the DMCA to prevent the 
sale of replacement garage door openers, where the replacement transmitter 
allegedly “circumvented” the technological access controls on the receiving 
opener device (pp. 186–87). In both cases, the plaintiffs lost, but on grounds 
that might not discourage similar attempts in the future. 
Both of these cases recall the essential situation in the Motion Picture 
Patents case, where the patent holder attempted to control the market for 
films played on the patented machine.25 Yet copyrights are obtained much 
more easily and apply for a much longer time than patents, making the 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2006). 
 25. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
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extension of a copyright monopoly to control a market for interoperable 
devices substantially more troubling from an antitrust policy perspective. 
To address these sorts of cases, Carrier argues that plaintiffs bringing an-
ticircumvention claims under the DMCA should be required to prove (1) 
that the expressive qualities of the product (the copyright-relevant qualities) 
are what is driving consumer demand for the product, and (2) that the al-
leged violations actually threaten direct market harm (pp. 193–97). If this 
standard were adopted, we could at least be assured that copyright claims 
based on the sale of replacement parts for garage door openers and printer 
cartridges would fail. (Most consumers, I imagine, do not buy garage door 
openers or printer cartridges to enjoy the poetry of their operating code.) 
Additionally, even in cases involving products at the core of copyright, 
plaintiffs would need to explain to a court exactly how a defendant’s activi-
ties would threaten to erode prospective sales. 
Most technology manufacturers and consumers would welcome Car-
rier’s proposal. It seems sensible to require DMCA claims to have some true 
connection to a copyright-like interest. Additionally, by requiring copyright 
owners to provide evidence of harm, Carrier’s proposal recognizes the fact 
that many technologies that entail the circumvention of technological barri-
ers are not intrinsically harmful to the economic interests of copyright 
holders (pp. 195–97). Indeed, in some cases, they can benefit the copyright 
owners, making their products more flexible and valuable.26 
My intuition is that, as I said earlier, Carrier has picked three proposals 
for copyright law reform that will be supported by a majority of legal schol-
ars. I am not saying that every person in the legal academy would endorse 
these proposals, but they are clearly targeted at well-recognized problems 
where copyright law is thought to be failing to serve the public interest.  
Personally, I would be delighted if these proposals were adopted. The 
technological upside here significantly outweighs the copyright downside. 
Indeed, I’m not sure that modifying copyright in the ways suggested by Car-
rier results in any social costs at all. In other words, copyright law does not 
need to bend from its own stated purposes to better serve the goals of inno-
vation. It serves its own purposes better with these pro-innovation 
modifications. 
And this is why, while I’m entirely supportive of Carrier’s reforms, I 
wish he had taken his arguments a little further. 
IV. Innovation’s Counterweight? 
To present my concern, I want to start by walking through Carrier’s 
three proposals again, asking a few questions along the way. (I should note 
at the outset that the ground I am about to cover is well traversed.)27 
                                                                                                                      
 26. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet And How to Stop 
It (2008) (explaining how open technological architectures can be “generative”). 
 27. I frame these as brief personal reactions to Carrier’s copyright proposals here, but they 
are in fact reactions that reflect the volumes that have already been written about the many potential 
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Carrier’s first proposal is to return to the Sony rule established in 1984 
with respect to copyright infringement standards applied to consumer 
dual-use devices. Quite a few important and copyright-relevant things have 
happened, however, in the last twenty-five years. Sony was decided ten 
years prior to the popular explosion of the internet, itself a dual-use tech-
nology that is delivering innovations that are changing the world in quite 
profound ways. If nothing else, a return to the Sony rule in this new tech-
nological age seems conservative. Arguably, the social benefits being 
delivered by the internet and digital networks warrant a standard more fa-
vorable to innovative technologies than the Sony rule.28  
Carrier’s second proposal could also go further. Carrier, when it comes 
down to framing the proposal, is taking no issue with the existing liability 
imposed by copyright law on direct infringers, who are increasingly average 
consumers with no knowledge of how copyright law’s stiff penalties might 
play out in their own lives. The parent of a teenager surfing for music online 
may find it troubling that two copyright owners have a plausible legal claim 
to potential statutory damages of $150,000 for a single willfully infringing 
mouse click.29 The recording industry, as Carrier notes, has already sued tens 
of thousands of individuals (including parents of teenagers) for copyright 
infringement (p. 122). Would parents settling these suits for thousands of 
dollars feel better knowing that the creators of the file-sharing programs 
used by their children were insulated from statutory damages? 
Finally, Carrier argues that the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions 
should be limited to cases at the core of copyright. Most critics of the anti-
circumvention provisions, however, don’t limit their claims in this way. 
They complain about how the law is ineffective in preventing infringement, 
how it is chilling with respect to academic research and free speech, and 
how it abrogates traditional rights of consumer fair use.30 To the minds of 
many scholars, the social costs of the anticircumvention laws today seem to 
clearly outweigh the benefits provided by the statute as a whole. So while 
the DMCA might be limited to cases where real copyright interests are in-
volved, why stop there? Why not jettison the anticircumvention provisions 
altogether? 
Carrier’s book does not make any explicit case for these broader propos-
als. Yet the tenor of his criticisms suggests that he would not oppose them. 
So exactly why does he avoid a more aggressive stance toward copyright 
                                                                                                                      
variations of copyright reform. Taking the Sony case alone, over 2,000 law reviews make mention of 
the case, and I would bet that the majority of these endorse some carefully considered view of Sony 
and ultimately advocate some sort of legislative or doctrinal reform. See pp. 109–11, 133–35. 
 28. Citing to anyone may risk a chain reaction of obligatory footnotes, but to my mind, one 
of the best critiques of the Sony rule is Litman, supra note 21. 
 29. As all copyright lawyers know, musical mp3s can infringe (at least) two copyrights: one 
in the musical composition and one in the sound recording. 
 30. Again, there are too many arguments to cite, but the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
certainly deserves to be listed as one of the most strident critics of the anticircumvention provisions. 
See Fred Von Lohmann, Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years under the DMCA 
(2010), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-unintended-consequences-12-years.pdf. 
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reform? What is the copyright counterweight operating against further for-
warding of technological innovation? What would the public lose, exactly, if 
we were to expand the protections of the Sony rule, do away with all forms 
of statutory damages, and repeal the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions 
entirely? 
My impression is that Carrier does not make this move because he wants 
to limit his proposals to those that directly promote technological innova-
tion. The problem, Carrier claims, is that “the link between copyright and 
innovation . . . . has been lost in the glare of the creativity spotlight that 
courts and scholars have shined on copyright law” (p. 103). So Carrier’s 
strategy is to explain how courts are actually weighing innovation against 
creativity in many cases, and disfavoring innovation in the process.31 
Carrier argues that even when courts do not do it explicitly, this is the 
way things play out as a result of three systemic asymmetries (pp. 128–33). 
The first and most important is what Carrier calls “innovation asymmetry.” 
Contemporary copyright holders, when they appear before courts and legis-
lators, are adept at showing the present harms they suffer from the arrival of 
innovative dual-use technologies. They point to widespread popular in-
fringements and quantify how much they might have made if each 
downloaded song had instead been subject to a lawful sale or license. By 
contrast, those who distribute dual-use technologies can point to little more 
than their investment costs and the popularity of the new technology with 
consumers (both of which may be attributed, by plaintiffs, to the prospect of 
the technology’s infringing uses). Yet this account fails to represent the true 
social benefits that dual-use technologies ultimately deliver.  
As Carrier points out, unanticipated applications of new technologies are 
often the rule rather than the exception. The telephone was first envisioned 
as a broadcast medium, while the phonograph was thought to be marketable 
as a means to memorialize last words (p. 129). In the early stages of any 
new technology’s introduction, society can only guess about the technol-
ogy’s ultimate utility.32 Indeed, the private parties introducing important new 
technologies will likely obtain only the smallest fraction of the value of the 
benefits that society obtains. Yet courts and legislators often weigh copy-
right’s bird in hand more heavily than new technology’s hundred in the 
bush. This is a mistake, since it favors a clearly perceptible but limited 
social benefit over a currently uncertain and unseen—but potentially vast—
social gain.  
Carrier has two related asymmetry arguments that flow from the first. 
Carrier’s “error-costs asymmetry” is essentially the observation that when 
courts favor copyright over new technology, not only do they act with preju-
dice to future social benefits, but the social costs of their balancing errors 
                                                                                                                      
 31. Carrier relies in part on Tony Reese’s contribution to the voluminous corpus of Sony 
commentary. See R. Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on 
Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 Case Wes. Res. L. Rev. 877, 881–98 
(2005).  
 32. Id. at 889–90. 
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are never appreciated, since the future benefits of the stifled technology may 
never become apparent (p. 131).  
Carrier’s third asymmetry, the “litigation costs asymmetry,” notes how 
firms that benefit from copyright entitlements have the power and the mo-
tive to limit the socially beneficial Schumpeterian “creative destruction” of 
their business models (pp. 131–33). Copyright incumbents will have incen-
tives to impose substantial litigation costs on smaller entrepreneurs who 
threaten their profits. Again, present private wealth trumps future popular 
wealth. 
Carrier’s innovation asymmetry certainly supports his argument, but it 
works to cabin his claims as well. By focusing only on innovative technolo-
gies, Carrier effectively takes our focus away from the core of copyright law 
theory. He works to trim the antitechnology excess off copyright’s frame, 
getting it down to a more competitive weight. But I would argue that the 
core “creativity” theory of copyright has its own problems that go hand in 
hand with Carrier’s pro-innovation arguments.  
Carrier’s reform arguments make even more sense when they are sup-
ported and supplemented by a broader critical perspective on contemporary 
copyright law. 
V. Publishers and the Public Interest 
While Carrier suggests that copyright is largely unrelated to the promo-
tion of innovation, there is actually a deep historic link between copyright 
law and new technology. Ironically, while the internet is sometimes de-
scribed as a mechanism for destroying copyright, the birth of copyright is 
inseparable from state attempts to control a different innovative technology: 
the printing press.33 While the printing press was recognized as a great inno-
vation with commercial potential, it was also a technology that threatened 
contemporary powers by enabling the circulation of heretical and seditious 
texts.  
The English crown answered this technological threat in various ways 
over the course of time. Most importantly for our purposes, in 1557 it cre-
ated a licensing regime whereby a particular guild, the Stationers’ Company, 
enjoyed, in essence, a form of commercial monopoly on the printing of 
books as well as the exclusive right to police against the sale of heretical 
and seditious books.34 The term “copy right” was not coined as a state pol-
icy for promoting creativity by vesting rights in authors, but rather as a 
method for efficient market exploitation within a censorial cartel.35 By 
                                                                                                                      
 33. I am not a historian, but I should note that there is general agreement about the facts that 
follow. This thumbnail sketch is based on the work of others, such as Joseph Loewenstein, The 
Author’s Due: Printing and the Prehistory of Copyright (2002); Lyman Ray Patterson, 
Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Inven-
tion of Copyright (1993). There are, at this point, many learned scholars who study the early 
history of copyright. 
 34. See Patterson supra note 33, at 28–29. 
 35. See id. at 42–43. 
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providing a system by which individual printers could register with the Sta-
tioners’ Company exclusive rights to print a particular text, the cartel 
established the basis for modern copyright.36 This arrangement endured for 
over a century.37  
Given the standard invocation of the “authorial incentive” notion of copy-
right by courts and commentators, this may seem like a radical reframing of 
copyright history. However, it is in fact the consensus account of copyright 
prior to 1710 by historians.38 After 1710, “modern” copyright emerged with 
the Statute of Anne, the English legislation that vested original copyright in 
the hands of authors, rather than commercial printers.39 Since modern copy-
right is now officially 300 years old, there will surely be much more said 
about the Statute of Anne and its origins in the next couple of years. Yet it is 
already the case that scholars disagree about exactly how much the Statute of 
Anne changed things and how much it left the same.40  
Rather than join this debate, I will make a fairly innocuous observation: 
it seems clear that the Statute of Anne was not enacted in response to some 
pervasive crisis concerning insufficient creative literary output in England at 
the time. Instead it was, according to the majority of scholars, enacted pri-
marily at the behest of the Stationers’ Company as a compromise measure 
following the failure of Parliament to renew its monopoly privileges.41 In 
other words, the London booksellers sought and managed to obtain the first 
modern copyright law in an effort to replace some of what they had lost 
when the crown failed to perpetuate their monopoly. 
After the enactment of the Statute of Anne, it seems there were no radi-
cal changes in the quality or quantity of authorship being produced. 
Certainly, the presence or absence of copyright did play a role in the way 
authorship was understood and the way the texts were created and circulated 
in England. The pre-Anne works of Shakespeare, Milton, and Donne were 
different, in some ways, than the post-Anne works of Swift, Pope, and 
                                                                                                                      
 36. See id. at 42–77. 
 37. See id. at 143–44. 
 38. See Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 907, 922–25 
(2005); Edward Lee, Freedom Of The Press 2.0, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 309, 320–27 (2008); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813, 815–17 (2001); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property 
and Constitutional Norms, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 272, 320–21 (2004); Malla Pollack, Purveyance 
and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings 
Clause in the Public’s Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1, 95–99 (2000); Mark Rose, The 
Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: Areopagitica, the Stationers’ Company, and the 
Statute of Anne, 12 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 123, 133–39 (2009); Diane Leenheer Zimmer-
man, It’s an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive Essence, 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187, 
191–93 (2005). 
 39. 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (UK). 
 40. For a wonderful sampling of contemporary thoughts on the Statute of Anne, you can visit 
the website of the Copyright@300 conference and download free—and legal—mp3s featuring the 
remarks of various luminaries within the copyright scholarship pantheon. See Copyright@300, 
Berkley Law, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/statuteofanne/schedule.htm. 
 41. E.g., Pollack, supra note 38, at 95–99; Rose, supra note 38, at 138. 
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Jonson.42 But while copyright may have influenced the lives of authors and 
their business strategies as well as the ways in which authorship happened 
and was performed, the fact is that copyright law was still primarily a spe-
cialized concern of those in the business of printing and publishing. After 
all, publishers generally obtained, by transfer, the copyrights of original au-
thors, who generally had little control of their copyright after that point.43  
So we can see that copyright originated in a manner somewhat at odds 
with its ostensible goals of rewarding authors for creativity. Its historical 
progression over the last three hundred years is even stranger if one buys 
into the authorial incentive story that is so frequently cited by courts and 
commentators as the rationale behind copyright. Copyright law has gained 
substantial power during the last three centuries without any clear theoreti-
cal justification for its expansion. Indeed, the Supreme Court has implied 
that a reasonable author should not just anticipate the current copyright bar-
gain, but should also anticipate that entitlements will continue to expand, 
because that is the sort of thing that copyright law just seems to do.44 
The Statute of Anne granted an initial fourteen-year copyright term to 
authors. Yet today, a typical new copyright will last at least a century, proba-
bly longer. In terms of copyright’s scope, the original laws in the United 
States were limited to books, charts, and maps. Today, copyright includes 
artwork, theatrical performances, photography, phonographs, film, computer 
programs, and physical architecture—and even things unknown, if they are 
expressive and fixed in a tangible medium.45 
Why so many expansions in duration and scope? At no time in the past 
three hundred years was the world suddenly confronted with a crisis in 
creative production. Instead, the most plausible answer seems to be that the 
industries that stand to benefit from broader copyright protection have 
succeeded in convincing legislators to expand the power and scope of 
copyright without much of a theoretical basis for doing so. After 
legislators were convinced that copyright law was good, more expansive 
copyright law almost always seemed better. As Jessica Litman has said, the 
history of copyright is the history of a one-way ratchet.46 
But most importantly and most pertinent to the present situation, the 
class of individuals subject to copyright law has been broadened. During the 
majority of copyright’s history, including its prehistory, copyright has been 
primarily a law of unfair competition, wielded by publishers against other 
publishers in the trade. But today, given the proliferation of computer 
                                                                                                                      
 42. The relation of the author to the text and its circulation has always been complex, but the 
availability of copyright certainly shaped how Swift, Pope, and Jonson understood their place in 
society. See Joseph Loewenstein, Ben Jonson and Possessive Authorship (2002). 
 43. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, An Empire of Law: Chancellor Kent and the Revolution in Books 
in the Early Republic, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 377, 395–96 (2009). 
 44. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 (2003) (“[T]he author of a work created in the last 
170 years would reasonably comprehend . . . a copyright not only for the time in place when protec-
tion is gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during that time.”). 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 46. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 80 (2001). 
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networks and other new dual-use technologies that evolved from the photo-
copier and videocassette recorder, copyright law reaches out to police 
ubiquitous public behaviors, such as the everyday use of personal com-
puters. As the pioneering lawsuits of the recording industry have shown, 
members of the general public can now be counted among the ranks of po-
tential copyright defendants. 
All of this is to say that we may be at an inflection point in copyright 
law. Copyright’s guiding theory seems substantially unmoored. The benefits 
it provides to the general public are being subjected to thorough re-
examination. The time may be ripe, therefore, to bring innovation policy to 
bear more centrally and forcefully on the institution of copyright.  
VI. A Foot in the Door? 
As I stated earlier, Carrier’s proposals are modest and supported by ab-
undant common sense. Yet I worry that they face a substantial challenge, 
given that they sail into a buffeting legislative headwind of increasing copy-
right protections. Trimming a small bit of the fat off contemporary copyright 
law in favor of the public’s benefit might not sound like a radical idea, but it 
would fly in the face of everything we’ve known about copyright law up to 
this point.47 As Herbert Hovenkamp has noted, “[T]he Copyright Act reads 
like a recipe book for capture, with numerous special provisions favoring 
this or that interest group.”48  
If we look to the recent history of copyright legislation, this description 
rings true, and hence the prospect would seem bleak for any public-minded 
copyright reform. Yet there are glimmers of hope. In recent years, some ma-
jor technology companies that often find themselves on the sharp end of 
copyright (such as Google) have started paying closer attention to the legis-
lative process. At the same time, popular concern about copyright law seems 
to be growing. A cadre of contemporary copyright law scholars (including 
many operating outside of law schools) are writing books, blogs, and arti-
cles targeted at broad audiences expressing profound skepticism about 
contemporary copyright law.49 Grassroots consumer-focused organizations, 
like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge, are playing 
an active role in bringing copyright issues to the attention of the media and 
decision makers. If Carrier’s three proposals were actually supported by 
legislators, this would constitute a major turning point.  
                                                                                                                      
 47. For an excellent overview of how recent copyright legislation has worked in practice, see 
id. 
 48. Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 125. Along similar lines, see Christina Bohannan, Re-
claiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 567, 568 (2006) (“[T]he Copyright Act confers 
overly broad rights to copyright owners at the expense of the public interest . . . .”); Marci A. Hamil-
ton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. 
L.J. 655 (1996); Lunney, supra note 38. 
 49. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production 
Transforms Markets and Freedom (2006); Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright 
and the Shape of Digital Culture 27 (2007); Litman, supra note 46; Siva Vaidhyanathan, 
Copyrights and Copywrongs 148 (2001). 
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Ideally, though, we would do so much more. Carrier’s innovation 
asymmetry suggests that when law prevents innovation, we never know the 
true social benefits offered by the road not taken. It follows that likewise, we 
do not know exactly what the world might look like if contemporary copy-
right had a more reasonable duration, a less punitive system of remedies, a 
clearer system of rules, and a greater solicitude for the needs and concerns 
of the average citizen. Most importantly, we do not know what effects, if 
any, such a regime would have on the promotion of cultural creativity, the 
putative goal of our contemporary copyright law. 
The internet, however, might give us some hazy glimpses of that path 
not followed. As Carrier notes, there is a very odd fact about the internet: it 
does not seem that the network’s failure to facilitate strong proprietary rights 
in information has led to any marked deficit in creative production. To the 
contrary, it seems that technologies granting authors the ability to share their 
creativity widely, without strong proprietary controls and attendant financial 
rewards, are eagerly deployed by authors seeking to reach popular audi-
ences.
50
 Network technology, not copyright, is the force behind this 
explosion of socially beneficial creative production. 
When we consider phenomena like blogs, wikis, and other forms of in-
ternet-based creativity, it seems possible that copyright law today is doing at 
least as much to limit creativity as it does to enable it. The copyright stories 
that hail from the internet often seem to feature corporate copyright owners 
seeking to stifle the work of creative amateurs who write fan fiction or cre-
ate “mashup” works and parodies. The consumer who seeks to create and 
share is cast as a copyright pirate. To the extent that copyright law is used in 
this manner, it seems to operate, in Carrier’s calculus, as a counterweight to 
both innovation and creativity itself. It may be that if we favor new tech-
nologies very broadly, do away with statutory damages entirely, and 
completely repeal the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, we may 
find ourselves in a world that we have failed to imagine—a world with even 
more innovation, and better yet, even more creativity. 
Many legal commentators today boggle at the current trend of legislators 
pursuing even more expansive and draconian copyright laws to tame net-
work technologies. (The recent secret international Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement negotiations, apparently driven by U.S. copyright indus-
tries, are a case in point.)51 Increasingly, it seems that the politician’s 
“middle-class America” is growing tired of being repeatedly informed via 
compulsory DVD messages that making noncommercial copies of motion 
pictures may subject them to a stint of five years in federal prison. Those 
who take this prospect seriously are among the many people fired up about 
copyright reform. Copyright critics may be devotees of Lawrence Lessig’s 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
951, 955 (2004). 
 51. See, e.g., David Kravets, ACTA Draft: No Internet for Copyright Scofflaws, Wired, Mar. 
24, 2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/terminate-copyright-scofflaws/. 
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“remix culture,”52 they may be students unlawfully swapping mp3 files with 
friends, or they may be technology enthusiasts who are members of the free 
software movement.53 Whatever the case, they have a common thought: 
copyright may be the law, but the law is not working. 
Carrier’s innovation-based policy arguments will add fuel to these fires, 
but I imagine that if his proposals are adopted—if the public interest in copy-
right is taken seriously—more reforms will inevitably follow. If the public 
indeed gets the copyright law that it wants, it will ask for reforms that go sub-
stantially beyond Carrier’s limited carve-outs for innovative technologies. 
Conclusion 
Michael Carrier asks his readers to seriously consider the effects of to-
day’s IP laws on innovation. He gives us three modest proposals for 
copyright law reform that will promote technological innovation. But if we 
can really move copyright law to better serve the public interest, we should 
not stop there. We should create a truly innovative copyright.  
                                                                                                                      
 52. Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy (2008).  
 53. See Free Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org/. 
